Thomas R. Palfrey
Flintridge Foundation Professor of Economics and Political Science
Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

California Institute of Technology

 

E-mail: trp at hss.caltech.edu
Office: 301A Baxter Hall
Phone: (626) 395-4088
Fax: (626) 432-1726

 

On leave until July 2015 at:

 

Russell Sage Foundation

112 E. 64th St.

New York, NY 10021

(212) 750-6003

 


CV


 

 Selected recent publications

 

The Dynamic Free Riding with Irreversible Investments. (with M. Battaglini and S. Nunnari), American Economic Review, forthcoming. Appendix

 

Symmetric play in repeated allocation games (with C. Kuzmics and B. Rogers), Journal of Economic Theory, forthcoming.

 

Vote Trading With and Without Party Leaders (with A. Casella and S. Turban) Journal of Public Economics, forthcoming. Appendix

 

Turnout and Power Sharing (with H. Herrera and M. Morelli). Economic Journal, forthcoming.

 

Experiments in Political Economy in The Handbook of Experimental Economics, Vol. II (Kagel and Roth, eds.), forthcoming.

 

Candidate Entry and Political Polarization: An Anti-Median Voter Theorem (with J. Grosser) American Journal of Political Science, 2014. Appendix

 

Legislative Bargaining and the Dynamics of Public Investment (with M. Battaglini and S. Nunnari), American Political Science Review, 2012. Appendix

 

Competitive Equilibrium in Markets for Votes (with A. Casella and A. Llorente-Saguer), Journal of Political Economy, 2012.

 

Speculative Overpricing in Asset Markets with Information Flows (with S. Wang) Econometrica, 2012.

 

 

Selected recent working papers

 

Voting with Communication: An Experimental Study of Correlated Equilibrium (with K. Pogorelskiy) January 2015.

 

How Cheap Talk Enhances Efficiency in Public Goods Games (with H. Rosenthal and N. Roy) Social Science Working Paper #1400, California Institute of Technology, January 2015.

 

Static and Dynamic Underinvestment: An Experimental Investigation (M. Agranov, G. Frechette, and E. Vespa) Social Science Working Paper #1399, California Institute of Technology, January 2015.

 

Quantal Response and Nonequilibrium Beliefs Explain Overbidding in Maximum-Value Auctions (with C. Camerer and S. Nunnari) December 2014.

 

Ignorance and Bias in Collective Decisions (with A. Elbittar, A. Gomberg, and C. Martinelli) Social Science Working Paper #1386, California Institute of Technology, March 2014

 

External Validation of Voter Turnout Models by Concealed Parameter Recovery (with A. Merlo) Social Science Working Paper #1370, California Institute of Technology, February 2014.

 

Equilibrium Tax Rates and Income Redistribution (with M. Agranov), Social Science Working Paper #1385, California Institute of Technology, January 2014.

 

The Dynamic Free Rider Problem: A Laboratory Study (with M. Battaglini and S. Nunnari), Social Science Working Paper #1371, California Institute of Technology, Current Version May 2014