Thomas R. Palfrey
Flintridge Foundation Professor of Economics and Political Science
Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
E-mail: trp at
Office: 301A Baxter Hall
Phone: (626) 395-4088
Fax: (626) 395-8967
Selected recent publications
Quantal Response Equilibrium: A Stochastic Theory of Games (with J. Goeree and C. Holt) Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ, 2016.
Quantal Response and Non-equilibrium Beliefs Explain Overbidding in Maximum-Value Auctions (with C. Camerer and S. Nunnari) Games and Economic Behavior, 2016.
Equilibrium Tax Rates and Income Redistribution (with M. Agranov), Journal of Public Economics, 2015.
The Dynamic Free Rider Problem: A Laboratory Study (with M. Battaglini and S. Nunnari), American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2016.
Static and Dynamic Underinvestment: An Experimental Investigation (with M. Agranov, G. Frechette, and E. Vespa), Journal of Public Economics, 2016..
How Cheap Talk Enhances Efficiency in Threshold Public Goods Games (with H. Rosenthal and N. Roy) Games and Economic Behavior, forthcoming.
Ignorance and Bias in Collective Decisions (with A. Elbittar, A. Gomberg, and C. Martinelli) Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, forthcoming.
Selected recent working papers
Trading Votes for Votes: A Dynamic Theory (with A. Casella), Working paper, Columbia University, February 2017.
Candidate Entry and Political Polarization: An Experimental Study (with J. Grosser), Working Paper, California Institute of Technology, December 2016.
The Effects of Income Mobility and Tax Persistence on Income Redistribution and Inequality (with M. Agranov), Social Science Working Paper #1423, California Institute of Technology, October 2016.
Communication Among Voters Benefits the Majority Party (with K. Pogorelskiiy), Social Science Working Paper #1422, California Institute of Technology, revised May 2017.
The Political Economy of Public Debt: A Laboratory Study (with M. Battaglini and S. Nunnari), Working Paper #1415, California Institute of Technology, February 2016.