Allen and Lenabelle Davis Professor of Economics and Social Sciences

CV Publications Contact

2010s - 2000s - 1990s - 1980s - 1970s - 1960s
"The Speed of Information Revelation and Eventual Price Quality in Markets with Insiders: Comparing Two Theories" with Peter Bossaerts and Cary Frydman, accepted at Review of Finance, 2012
"Optimal Dynamic Nonlinear Income Taxes with No Committment" with Marcus Berliant, accepted (subject to very minor revisions) at Journal of Public Economic Theory
"Non-Coercion, Efficiency and Incentive Compatibility in Public Goods Decisions", to appear inCoercion and Social Welfare, eds. Jorge Martinez and Stanely Winer, 2012
"Individual Evolutionary Learning with Many Agents" with Jasmina Arifovic, in The Knowledge Engineering Review, Volume 27, Issue 02, June 2012, pp 239-254
"Individual Evolutionary Learning Other-regarding Perferences, and the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism" with Jasmina Arifovic, in Journal of Public Economics, 96 (2012), 808-823
"A Behavior Model for Mechanism Design: Individual Evolutionary Learning" with Jasmina Arifovic, in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Volume 78, Issue 3, May 2011, 374-395
"Efficiency of Continuous Double Auctions under Individual Evolutionary Learning with Full or Limited Information" with Mikhail Anufriev, Jasmin Arifovic, Valentyn Pachenko, in Journal of Evolutionary Economics, May 2011
"An Experimental Test of Flexible Combinatorial Spectrum Auction Formats" with Charles Holt, Jacob Goeree, and Christof Brunner, in American Economic Journal, Feb 2010
"Prediction Markets: Alternative Mechanisms for Complex Environments with Few Traders" with Paul J. Healy, Sera Linardi, J. Richard Lowery,in Management Science, 2010
"Using Neural Measures of Economic Value to Solve the Public Goods Free-Rider Problem", with Ian Krajbich, Colin Camerer, and Antonio Rangel, Science, 326, 596-99, October 2009
"Market Design Experiments", with Yan Chen, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, second edition, 2009
"An Experimental Test of Combinatoric Information Markets" with Robin Hanson, and Takashi Ishikida, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 69(2) 2009, 182-189
"Call Market Book Information and Efficiency", with Jasmina Arifovic, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 31, 2007, 1971-2000
"A General Characterization of Interim Efficient Mechanisms for Independent Linear Environments", with Tom Palfrey, Journal of Economic Theory 133 (2007) 441-466
"Contracting Inside an Organization: An Experimental Study," with C. Noussair, H. Thronson, P. Ulrich, and G. Vars, Experimental Economics, February 2007
"Voting and Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms" chapter 26 in The Handbook of Political Economy, eds. Barry Weingast and Donald Wittman, Oxford University Press, 2006
"A New and Improved Design for Multi-Object Iterative Auctions," with Anthony M. Kwasnica, David Porter, and Christine DeMartini., Management Science 51(3) 419-434, 2005
"Designing Information Markets for Policy Analysis", in Information Markets: A New Way of Making Decisions in the Public and Private Sectors, ed. Robert Hahn, AEI-Brookings Joint Center, 2005
"Scaling up Learning Models in Public Good Games," with Jasmina Arifovic, Journal of Economic Theory, 6(2) 203-238, 2004
“Information and Dynamics: Sequences of Call Markets,” with Jasmina Arifovic. Information Systems Frontiers, 5(1): 39-45, 2003.
Inducing Liquidity In Thin Financial Markets Through Combined-Value Trading Mechanisms,” with Peter Bossaerts, and Leslie Fine. European Economics Review, 46(9): 1671-1695, October 2002.
“The First Use of a Combined Value Auction for Transportation Services,” with Mark Olson, David Porter, Joseph A. Swanson, and David P. Torma. Interfaces, 32(5):4-12, September - October 2002.
The Approximation of Efficient Public Good Mechanisms by Simple Voting Schemes,” with Thomas Palfrey. Journal of Public Economics 83(2):153-171, February 2002.
“Experimental Testbedding of a Pollution Trading System: Southern California’s RECLAIM Emissions Market,” with Takashi Ishikida, Mark Olson, and David Porter, in Research in Experimental Economics, edited by R. Mark Issac, pp. 185-220, JAI Press, 2001.
Concurrent Trading in Experimental Markets with Demand Interdependence,” with Arlington Williams, and Vernon Smith. Economic Theory, Vol. 16, No. 3, November 2000, pp. 511-528.
“Mutually Destructive Bidding: The FCC Auction Design Problem,” with Mark M. Bykowsky and Robert J. Cull. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 17(3): pp. 205-228, May 2000.
A Market-Based Mechanism for Allocating Space Shuttle Secondary Payload Priority,” with David Porter and Randii Wessen. Experimental Economics, 2(3): 173-195, March 2000.
“A Characterization of Interim Efficiency with Public Goods,” with Thomas R. Palfrey, Econometrica, Vol. 67, No. 2 (March, 1999), 435-448.
Interim Efficiency in a Public Goods Problem,” with Thomas R. Palfrey, in La Bibliotheque Scientifique Francqui Vol. 2, “Social Organization and Mechanism Design, Proceedings of the Second Francqui Colloquium, 10-11 June 1996, Brussels,” edited by Claude d’Aspremont, De Boeck & Larcier s.a., Brussels, 1999.
“Repeated Implementation,” with Ehud Kalai, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 83, No. 2, December 1998, p. 308-317
Experiments Testing Multiobject Allocation Mechanisms,” with David Porter and Antonio Rangel, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1997, pp. 639-675.
“The Allocation of a Shared Resource within an Organization,” with Charles Noussair and David Porter, Economic Design, Vol. 2, No. 2, November 1996, pp. 163-192.
Political Competition in a Model of Economic Growth: Some Theoretical Results,” with R. Boylan and R. McKelvey, Economic Theory, Vol. 7, No.2, 1996, pp. 191-207.
“Introduction,” with Thomas R. Palfrey. Games and Economic Behavior, Vol 10, Number 1, 1995, pp. 1-5
Using Computerized Exchange Systems to Solve an Allocation Problem in Project Management,” with David Porter and Antonio Rangel. Journal of Organizational Computing, Vol. 4, Number 3, 1994, pp. 271-296.
“Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research,” in Handbook of Experimental Economics, edited by J. Kagel and A. Roth, Princeton University Press, 1995.
Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms,” with T. Palfrey. The Review of Economic Studies, 61:327-355, 1994.
“Designing Organizations for Trading Pollution Rights,” with K. Szakaly. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 25 (1994): 167-196.
The Design of Coordination Mechanisms and Organizational Computing,” Journal of Organizational Computing, 3(1), pp. 121-134, 1993.
“Theories of Price Formation and Exchange in Double Oral Auctions,” with D. Easley. The Double Auction Market: Institutions, Theories and Evidence, edited by D. Friedman, J. Geanakoplos, D. Lane, and J. Rust, Santa Fe Institute Studies in the Sciences of Complexity, Proceedings Volume XV., Addison-Wesley 1992.
Political Competition in a Model of Economic Growth: An Experimental Study,” with R. Boylan, A. Lupia, R. McKelvey, and P. Ordeshook. Laboratory Research in Political Economy, edited by T. Palfrey. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, pp.33-68, 1991.
“Coordination in Shared Facilities: A New Methodology” Journal of Organizational Computing, Vol.1, No. 1 (1991):41-59.
Allocating Uncertain and Unresponsive Resources” with J. Banks and D. Porter. The RAND Journal of Economics 20, No. 1 (Spring l989):1-25.
“Information Aggregation in Two-Candidate Elections,” in Contemporary Contributions to Political Theory, edited by Peter Ordeshook. University of Michigan Press, 1989.
“Incentive Compatibility: Ten Years Later,” with T. Groves, in Information, Incentives, and Economic Mechanisms, edited by T. Groves, R. Radner, and S. Reiter. University of Minnesota Press, 1988.
Economic Issues in the Development of New Technology,” in Symposium on NASA Space Communications: Research, Development and Application. The National Academy of Science, 1987.
“Incentive Compatibility,” in The New Palgrave, London: MacMillan Press, 1987.
Market Failure,” in The New Palgrave, London: MacMillan Press, 1987.
“The Economics of Space Station.” In Explorations in Space Policy: Emerging Economic and Technical Issues, edited by M.K. Macauley, Resources for the Future and the National Academy of Engineering, Washington, D.C., 1987.
“Elections and Reputations: A Comment on the Papers of Coughlin and Ferejohn.” Carnegie Papers on Political Economy VI. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff/Dr. W. Junk, 1986.
Incentive Compatible Space Station Pricing.American Economic Review 76 (1986):274-279.
The Scope of the Hypothesis of Bayesian Equilibrium.” Journal of Economic Theory 39 (1986):59-82.
The Pure Theory of Large Two Candidate Elections.” Public Choice 44 (1984):7-41. Reprinted in The Economics of Politics, edited by Dennis C. Mueller, Volumes on The International Library of Critical Writings in Economics, Series Editor: Mark Blaug, Cheltenham, England: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. 2000.
“The Paradox of Voting and Candidate Competition: A General Equilibrium Analysis.” In Essays in Contemporary Fields of Economics, edited by G. Horwich and J. Quirk. West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 1982.
The Existence of Efficient and Incentive Compatible Equilibria with Public Goods,” with T. Groves. Econometrica 48, No. 6 (Sept. l980):1487-1506.
“Dominant Strategy Mechanisms and Incomplete Information.” In Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences, edited by J. Laffont. New York: North Holland, 1979.
Private Alternative to the Judicial Process – Discussion.” Journal of Legal Studies, 8(2) (1979):323-398.

“Incentive Compatibility and Incomplete Information.” Journal of Economic Theory 18, No. 1 (June 1978):171-l89.
“Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the 'Free-Rider' Problem,” with T. Groves. Econometrica 45, No. 4 (May 1977):783-809. Reprinted in Library of Critical Writings in Economics, edited by Mark Blaug, Volume on Social Choice Theory edited by C.K. Rowley, Cheltenham, England: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd . 1992.
Some Limitations of Demand-Revealing Processes,” with T. Groves. Public Choice 29, No. 2 (Special Supplement to Spring 1977):107-124.
“Some Limitations of Demand-Revealing Processes,” – Reply, with T. Groves. Public Choice 29, No. 2 (Special Supplement to Spring 1977):139-143.
Incentive Compatible Behavior in Core-Selecting Organizations.” Econometrica 45, No. 7 (Oct. 1977):1607-1623.
Dynamics and Land Use: The Case of Forestry,” with L. Moses. In Public and Urban Economics: Essays in Honor of William Vickery, edited by R. Grieson, pp. 111-157. Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1976.
“On the Nature of Externalities: A Comment.” In Theory and Measurement of Economic Externalities, edited by S.A.Y. Lin, pp. 23-28. Orlando, Florida: Academic Press, 1976.
On Sequences of Temporary Equilibrium.” In Essays on Economic Behavior under Uncertainty, edited by Balch, McFadden, and Wu, pp. 332-338. New York: North Holland, 1974.
“Electoral Equilibrium: A Spatial Analysis Based on the Theory of Games - Rejoinder,” Journal of Politics 38(1) (1973).
A Theory of Electoral Equilibrium: A Spatial Analysis Based on the Theory of Games,” with M. Hinich and P. Ordeshook. Journal of Politics 35 (1973):154-193.
“Nonvoting and the Existence of Equilibrium under Majority Rule,” with M. Hinich and P. Ordeshook. Journal of Economic Theory 4, No. 2 (April 1972):144-153.
A Convergent Pareto-Satisfactory Non-Tatonnement Adjustment Process for a Class of Unselfish Exchange Environments.Econometrica 39, No. 3 (May 1971):467-499.
A Pseudo-metric Space of Probability Measures and the Existence of Measurable Utility.The Annals of Mathematical Statistics 42, No. 2 (April 1971):794-798.
“The Relation of Optima and Market Equilibria with Externalities.” Journal of Economic Theory 3, No. 1 (March 1971) :54-65.
Cost Benefit Analysis as a Statistical Hypothesis Test: An Example from Urban Transportation.Environment and Planning 2, No. 3, 1970.
Resource Allocation in Unselfish Environments.American Economic Review 58, No. 2 (May 1968):227-237.

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