2010s - 2000s - 1990s - 1980s - 1970s - 1960s
|"The Speed of Information Revelation and Eventual Price Quality in Markets with Insiders: Comparing Two Theories" with Peter Bossaerts and Cary Frydman, accepted at Review of Finance, 2012
|"Optimal Dynamic Nonlinear Income Taxes with No Committment" with Marcus Berliant, accepted (subject to very minor revisions) at Journal of Public Economic Theory
|"Non-Coercion, Efficiency and Incentive Compatibility in Public Goods Decisions", to appear inCoercion and Social Welfare, eds. Jorge Martinez and Stanely Winer, 2012
|"Individual Evolutionary Learning with Many Agents" with Jasmina Arifovic, in The Knowledge Engineering Review, Volume 27, Issue 02, June 2012, pp 239-254
|"Individual Evolutionary Learning Other-regarding Perferences, and the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism" with Jasmina Arifovic, in Journal of Public Economics, 96 (2012), 808-823
|"A Behavior Model for Mechanism Design: Individual Evolutionary Learning" with Jasmina Arifovic, in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Volume 78, Issue 3, May 2011, 374-395
|"Efficiency of Continuous Double Auctions under Individual Evolutionary Learning with Full or Limited Information" with Mikhail Anufriev, Jasmin Arifovic, Valentyn Pachenko, in Journal of Evolutionary Economics, May 2011
|"An Experimental Test of Flexible Combinatorial Spectrum Auction Formats" with Charles Holt, Jacob Goeree, and Christof Brunner, in American Economic Journal, Feb 2010
|"Prediction Markets: Alternative Mechanisms for Complex Environments with Few Traders" with Paul J. Healy, Sera Linardi, J. Richard Lowery,in Management Science, 2010
|"Using Neural Measures of Economic Value to Solve the Public Goods Free-Rider Problem", with Ian Krajbich, Colin Camerer, and Antonio Rangel, Science, 326, 596-99, October 2009
|"Market Design Experiments", with Yan Chen, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, second edition, 2009
|"An Experimental Test of Combinatoric Information Markets" with Robin Hanson, and Takashi Ishikida, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 69(2) 2009, 182-189
|"Call Market Book Information and Efficiency", with Jasmina Arifovic, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 31, 2007, 1971-2000
|"A General Characterization of Interim Efficient Mechanisms for Independent Linear Environments", with Tom Palfrey, Journal of Economic Theory 133 (2007) 441-466
|"Contracting Inside an Organization: An Experimental Study," with C. Noussair, H. Thronson, P. Ulrich, and G. Vars, Experimental Economics, February 2007
|"Voting and Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms" chapter 26 in The Handbook of Political Economy, eds. Barry Weingast and Donald Wittman, Oxford University Press, 2006
|"A New and Improved Design for Multi-Object Iterative Auctions," with Anthony M. Kwasnica, David Porter, and Christine DeMartini., Management Science 51(3) 419-434, 2005
|"Designing Information Markets for Policy Analysis", in Information Markets: A New Way of Making Decisions in the Public and Private Sectors, ed. Robert Hahn, AEI-Brookings Joint Center, 2005
|"Scaling up Learning Models in Public Good Games," with Jasmina Arifovic, Journal of Economic Theory, 6(2) 203-238, 2004
|“Information and Dynamics:
Sequences of Call Markets,” with Jasmina Arifovic. Information
Systems Frontiers, 5(1): 39-45, 2003.
In Thin Financial Markets Through Combined-Value Trading Mechanisms,” with Peter Bossaerts,
and Leslie Fine. European Economics Review, 46(9): 1671-1695,
|“The First Use of a Combined
Value Auction for Transportation Services,” with Mark Olson,
David Porter, Joseph A. Swanson, and David P. Torma. Interfaces,
September - October 2002.
of Efficient Public Good Mechanisms by Simple Voting Schemes,” with Thomas Palfrey. Journal of Public Economics 83(2):153-171, February 2002.
of a Pollution Trading System: Southern California’s RECLAIM
Emissions Market,” with Takashi Ishikida, Mark Olson, and
David Porter, in Research in Experimental Economics, edited by
R. Mark Issac, pp. 185-220,
JAI Press, 2001.
in Experimental Markets with Demand Interdependence,” with Arlington Williams,
and Vernon Smith. Economic Theory, Vol. 16, No. 3, November 2000,
Bidding: The FCC Auction Design Problem,” with Mark M.
Bykowsky and Robert J. Cull. Journal of Regulatory Economics,
17(3): pp. 205-228, May 2000.
|“A Market-Based Mechanism
for Allocating Space Shuttle Secondary Payload Priority,” with David Porter
and Randii Wessen. Experimental Economics, 2(3): 173-195, March
|“A Characterization of
Interim Efficiency with Public Goods,” with Thomas R. Palfrey, Econometrica, Vol. 67, No. 2 (March, 1999), 435-448.
in a Public Goods Problem,” with
Thomas R. Palfrey, in La Bibliotheque Scientifique Francqui Vol.
2, “Social Organization and Mechanism Design, Proceedings
of the Second Francqui Colloquium, 10-11 June 1996, Brussels,” edited
by Claude d’Aspremont, De Boeck & Larcier s.a., Brussels,
|“Repeated Implementation,” with
Ehud Kalai, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 83, No. 2, December
1998, p. 308-317
Multiobject Allocation Mechanisms,” with David Porter and Antonio Rangel, Journal
of Economics and Management Strategy, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1997, pp.
|“The Allocation of a Shared
Resource within an Organization,” with Charles Noussair
and David Porter, Economic Design, Vol. 2, No. 2, November 1996,
in a Model of Economic Growth: Some Theoretical Results,” with R. Boylan and R.
McKelvey, Economic Theory, Vol. 7, No.2, 1996, pp. 191-207.
Thomas R. Palfrey. Games and Economic Behavior, Vol 10, Number
1, 1995, pp. 1-5
Exchange Systems to Solve an Allocation Problem in Project
David Porter and Antonio Rangel. Journal of Organizational
Vol. 4, Number 3, 1994, pp. 271-296.
|“Public Goods: A Survey
of Experimental Research,” in Handbook of Experimental
Economics, edited by J. Kagel and A. Roth, Princeton University
|“Voting and Lottery
Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms,” with T. Palfrey. The
Review of Economic Studies, 61:327-355, 1994.
for Trading Pollution Rights,” with K. Szakaly. Journal
of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 25 (1994): 167-196.
|“The Design of Coordination
Mechanisms and Organizational Computing,” Journal
of Organizational Computing,
3(1), pp. 121-134, 1993.
|“Theories of Price Formation
and Exchange in Double Oral Auctions,” with D. Easley. The Double Auction Market: Institutions, Theories and Evidence,
edited by D. Friedman, J. Geanakoplos, D. Lane, and J. Rust,
Santa Fe Institute Studies in the Sciences of Complexity, Proceedings
Volume XV., Addison-Wesley 1992.
in a Model of Economic Growth: An Experimental Study,” with R. Boylan, A. Lupia,
R. McKelvey, and P. Ordeshook. Laboratory Research in Political
Economy, edited by T. Palfrey. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan
Press, pp.33-68, 1991.
|“Coordination in Shared
Facilities: A New Methodology” Journal of Organizational
Computing, Vol.1, No. 1 (1991):41-59.
Uncertain and Unresponsive Resources” with J. Banks and D. Porter. The
RAND Journal of Economics 20, No. 1 (Spring l989):1-25.
|“Information Aggregation in Two-Candidate
Elections,” in Contemporary Contributions to Political
Theory, edited by Peter Ordeshook. University of Michigan Press,
|“Incentive Compatibility: Ten Years Later,” with
T. Groves, in Information, Incentives, and Economic Mechanisms,
edited by T. Groves, R. Radner, and S. Reiter. University of
Minnesota Press, 1988.
|“Economic Issues in
the Development of New Technology,” in Symposium
on NASA Space Communications: Research, Development and Application. The National Academy of
|“Incentive Compatibility,” in The
New Palgrave, London: MacMillan Press, 1987.
|“Market Failure,” in The
London: MacMillan Press, 1987.
|“The Economics of Space Station.” In Explorations in Space Policy: Emerging Economic and Technical
Issues, edited by M.K. Macauley, Resources for the Future and
the National Academy of Engineering, Washington, D.C., 1987.
|“Elections and Reputations: A Comment on
the Papers of Coughlin and Ferejohn.” Carnegie Papers
on Political Economy VI. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff/Dr. W. Junk,
Space Station Pricing.” American
Economic Review 76 (1986):274-279.
|“The Scope of the
Hypothesis of Bayesian Equilibrium.” Journal
of Economic Theory 39 (1986):59-82.
|“The Pure Theory
of Large Two Candidate Elections.” Public
Choice 44 (1984):7-41. Reprinted in The Economics of Politics, edited by Dennis C. Mueller, Volumes
on The International Library of Critical Writings in Economics,
Series Editor: Mark Blaug, Cheltenham, England: Edward Elgar
Publishing Ltd. 2000.
|“The Paradox of Voting and Candidate Competition:
A General Equilibrium Analysis.” In Essays in Contemporary
Fields of Economics, edited by G. Horwich and J. Quirk. West
Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 1982.
|“The Existence of
Efficient and Incentive Compatible Equilibria with Public Goods,” with T. Groves. Econometrica 48, No. 6 (Sept. l980):1487-1506.
|“Dominant Strategy Mechanisms and Incomplete
Information.” In Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences,
edited by J. Laffont. New York: North Holland, 1979.
to the Judicial Process – Discussion.” Journal
of Legal Studies, 8(2) (1979):323-398.
|“Incentive Compatibility and Incomplete
Information.” Journal of Economic Theory 18, No. 1 (June
of Public Goods: A Solution to the 'Free-Rider' Problem,” with T. Groves. Econometrica 45, No. 4 (May 1977):783-809. Reprinted in Library
of Critical Writings in Economics, edited by Mark Blaug, Volume on Social
Choice Theory edited by C.K. Rowley, Cheltenham, England: Edward
Elgar Publishing Ltd . 1992.
of Demand-Revealing Processes,” with
T. Groves. Public Choice 29, No. 2 (Special Supplement to Spring
Limitations of Demand-Revealing Processes,” – Reply,
with T. Groves. Public Choice 29, No. 2 (Special Supplement to
Behavior in Core-Selecting Organizations.” Econometrica 45, No. 7 (Oct. 1977):1607-1623.
|“Dynamics and Land
Use: The Case of Forestry,” with
L. Moses. In Public and Urban Economics: Essays in Honor
of William Vickery, edited by R. Grieson, pp. 111-157. Lexington, Massachusetts:
Lexington Books, 1976.
the Nature of Externalities: A Comment.” In Theory and Measurement of Economic Externalities, edited by S.A.Y.
Lin, pp. 23-28. Orlando, Florida: Academic Press, 1976.
|“On Sequences of
Temporary Equilibrium.” In Essays on Economic Behavior under Uncertainty, edited by Balch,
McFadden, and Wu, pp. 332-338. New York: North Holland, 1974.
A Spatial Analysis Based on the Theory of Games - Rejoinder,” Journal
of Politics 38(1) (1973).
|“A Theory of Electoral
Equilibrium: A Spatial Analysis Based on the Theory of Games,” with M. Hinich
and P. Ordeshook. Journal of Politics 35 (1973):154-193.
|“Nonvoting and the
Existence of Equilibrium under Majority Rule,” with M. Hinich and P. Ordeshook. Journal of Economic Theory 4, No. 2 (April 1972):144-153.
Convergent Pareto-Satisfactory Non-Tatonnement Adjustment Process
for a Class of Unselfish
Exchange Environments.” Econometrica 39, No. 3 (May 1971):467-499.
|“A Pseudo-metric Space
of Probability Measures and the Existence of Measurable Utility.” The
Annals of Mathematical Statistics 42, No. 2 (April 1971):794-798.
|“The Relation of Optima
and Market Equilibria with Externalities.” Journal
of Economic Theory 3, No.
1 (March 1971) :54-65.
|“Cost Benefit Analysis
as a Statistical Hypothesis Test: An Example from Urban Transportation.” Environment
and Planning 2, No. 3, 1970.
Allocation in Unselfish Environments.” American
Economic Review 58, No. 2 (May 1968):227-237.